Latvia

1Cabinet of Ministers (Government of Latvia)

Note: The Kulbergs cabinet (Latvia's 43rd) is a caretaker government formed after PM Siliņa resigned on 14 May 2026 (a coalition collapse triggered by drone incidents and the sacking of the previous defense minister). Coalition: United List + New Unity + National Alliance + Union of Greens and Farmers. Expect a new government after the 3 October 2026 election.

2Parliament (Saeima)

3Intelligence and Security Services

4Armed Forces (National Armed Forces – Nacionālie bruņotie spēki, NBS)

Latvia's defense combines a professional force, a growing conscription-based State Defence Service (reintroduced in 2023), and the volunteer National Guard (Zemessardze), all within NATO collective defense.

• Commander of the National Armed Forces: Lieutenant General Leonīds Kalniņš.
• Main Branches: Land Forces, Naval Forces, Air Force, National Guard (Zemessardze).
• Conscription: State Defence Service reintroduced in 2023 (had been abolished in 2007); phased mandatory service rebuilding the reserve.

Key Military Priorities 2026

• Defense Spending: 4.73% of GDP in 2026 on the Ministry of Finance forecast (about 4.9% by the NATO definition). The Saeima legislated a statutory minimum of 5% from 2027 on 26 March 2026. Among NATO's highest ratios; emphasis on domestic defense industry.
• Baltic Defence Line: Constructing border fortifications with Russia and Belarus, coordinated with Estonia and Lithuania.
• Air Defense: Priority gap-filling after drone incursions; acquiring layered air-defense and counter-UAS.
• Host Nation Support: Hosting the NATO multinational brigade (Canada-led) at Ādaži; building the Sēlija training ground.
• Rail Baltica & Mobility: Military-mobility infrastructure as a strategic enabler for reinforcement.

Strategic Military Partnerships

• NATO / Canada: Canada is the framework nation for the NATO multinational brigade in Latvia — the principal forward partner.
• United States: Key bilateral partner for training, equipment, and deterrence.
• Estonia & Lithuania: Tight Baltic trilateral integration (air defense, Baltic Defence Line, joint procurement).

5NATO / EU Standing

Latvia is a committed frontline NATO/EU member, bordering both Russia and Belarus, and a consistent advocate of the hardest Western line toward Moscow.

• NATO: Member since 29 March 2004. Hosts a NATO multinational brigade (Canada-led) at Ādaži. Defense spending 4.73% of GDP in 2026, rising to a legislated minimum of 5% from 2027.
• EU: Member since 1 May 2004; Eurozone since 2014; Schengen. Pro-integration, pro-sanctions voice.
• Energy Decoupling: In February 2025, Latvia (with Estonia and Lithuania) desynchronized from the Russian/Belarusian BRELL grid and joined the Continental European grid — ending the last major Russian infrastructure dependency.
• Language & Society Policy: Since 2022, full transition of public schools to Latvian-language instruction, phase-out of Russian in the public sphere, and the ban on May 9 "Victory Day" gatherings — part of de-Sovietization and resilience-building.

6Russian Threat Vector

Latvia borders both Russia (~280 km) and Belarus (~170 km) and treats Moscow (and the Union State) as the defining security threat. Near-term threats are hybrid; the large Russian-speaking minority is the central internal vulnerability.

• Drone Incursions: Russian and Ukrainian drones have strayed into Latvian territory since 2022; a 2026 drone incident in eastern Latvia triggered the government crisis — exposing an air-defense gap.
• Migration Instrumentalization: Belarus/Russia funnelling migrants toward the border as hybrid pressure; countered by fortification.
• Espionage & Recruitment: Active Russian intelligence targeting; VDD prosecutes recruitment and defense-sector spying cases and warns against travel to Russia/Belarus.
• Information Operations: Sustained targeting of the Russian-speaking minority (~25–30%) via disinformation, "compatriots" narratives, and historical memory (Victory Day). The primary internal-resilience concern.
• Undersea & Baltic Sea: Participation in shadow-fleet and undersea-infrastructure monitoring with Baltic partners.

7Energy

Latvia holds an asset the rest of the region depends on, and that changes how its energy position should be read.

• Grid. Desynchronisation from the Russian and Belarusian BRELL ring in February 2025, jointly with Estonia and Lithuania, then synchronisation with the Continental European grid.
• Inčukalns. The underground gas storage facility is the largest in the Baltic region and the seasonal buffer for the whole Baltic gas market. It is Latvia's single most strategically significant piece of energy infrastructure and a corresponding protection priority.
• Gas supply. Russian pipeline gas has been legislatively excluded. Supply now arrives through regional LNG capacity, principally Klaipėda in Lithuania, with the proposed Skulte LNG terminal as a domestic option that remains contested.
• Generation. The Daugava hydropower cascade operated by Latvenergo carries a large share of domestic generation and makes output notably weather-dependent. Wind capacity is being built out to reduce that swing.
• The exposure. As with Estonia, what replaced Russia is regional and interconnected. Latvia's security of supply now depends on Baltic Sea infrastructure and on neighbours' terminals rather than on any single domestic source.

Sources: Latvian Ministry of Climate and Energy, Latvenergo and Conexus reporting, FBIH cycle reporting. Verified 07/09/2026.

8Economy

• Weak growth. Forecasts for 2026 range from 1.4% (European Commission) to about 2.1%; the economy expanded 2.5% in Q1 2026. Latvia is the slowest-growing of the three Baltic states.
• Defence, stated precisely. The 2026 defence budget is 4.73% of GDP on the Ministry of Finance forecast of March 2026, or about 4.9% measured by the NATO definition. On 26 March 2026 the Saeima legislated a minimum of 5% of GDP from 2027. The often-quoted "5% in 2026" is therefore a commitment about next year, not a description of this one.
• Deficit. Forecast between 3.0% (Ministry of Finance) and 3.3% (European Commission) of GDP in 2026, rising to about 4.1% in 2027, driven by defence investment, interest costs and social spending.
• Fiscal mechanism. The increase is being run under the EU fiscal framework's defence exceptional clause, which permits temporary excess over deficit and expenditure limits where the money goes to defence. This is the instrument that makes the Baltic rearmament fiscally possible.
• Structure. The Russian transit and logistics economy that once ran through Riga and Ventspils is largely gone and has not been replaced at equivalent scale. Wood, food processing and services carry the export base. Rail Baltica and airBaltic are the two large state-linked projects and both are politically contested.

Sources: European Commission economic forecast, Latvian Ministry of Finance (Budget 2026), LSM.lv, EBRD Transition Report 2025-26, wiiw. Verified 07/09/2026.

9National Interest Vector (Slovakia)

This is the strongest Slovak file in the Nordic-Baltic set, and it is not commercial. It is military.

• Slovak troops at Ādaži. The Slovak Armed Forces have contributed to the security of Latvia and the Baltic region since 2017, serving at the Ādaži training area within NATO's multinational brigade. Slovakia is not an observer of Baltic deterrence; it is a participant in it.
• Representation. Slovakia maintains a resident Embassy in Riga, whose remit covers both Latvia and Lithuania. Declared priorities are political, defence, economic and cultural cooperation, plus academic and sporting links.
• Political contact. On 3 October 2025 Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár held bilateral talks with Foreign Minister Baiba Braže, focused on deepening the dialogue and expanding economic cooperation.
• Shared frameworks. EU, NATO, the euro and Schengen. There is no structural obstacle to deeper cooperation.
• Where Slovak capability fits. The Baltic Defence Line generates sustained demand for counter-mobility, fortification engineering and demining. The 2026 drone incidents exposed an air-defence and counter-UAS gap that Latvia is now urgently filling. Rail Baltica military-mobility works are a further opening.

Sources: MZVEZ SR (Embassy Riga), Latvian MFA, FBIH cycle reporting. Verified 07/09/2026.

10Open Questions and Sensitive Points

• A caretaker government in an election year. The Kulbergs cabinet took office on 28 May 2026 after PM Siliņa resigned on 14 May, a collapse triggered by drone incidents and the removal of the previous defence minister. The 15th Saeima election falls on 3 October 2026. Anything read from the current cabinet's positions carries an expiry date.
• The air-defence gap. The drone incursions did not merely embarrass the government, they brought it down. Layered air defence and counter-UAS are the acknowledged capability shortfall.
• The minority cleavage. A Russian-speaking minority of roughly 25 to 30%, the largest proportion among the three Baltics. Non-citizens cannot vote in Saeima elections. Pro-minority parties are excluded from government by cross-party consensus. Language policy, the transition of public schools to Latvian instruction, and the ban on 9 May gatherings are the flashpoints, and each is a target for Russian information operations.
• Two hostile borders. Roughly 280 km with Russia and 170 km with Belarus, with migration instrumentalization run from both. Russia suspended the Pytalovo railway crossing with effect from 1 July 2026.
• Rail Baltica. Cost escalation and schedule slippage are a standing domestic controversy on a project that is simultaneously the region's most important military-mobility asset.
• Chronic coalition instability. Three governments in one parliamentary term. Security policy has held steady throughout, which is the reassuring part, but the churn slows everything else.

Sources: VDD and SAB annual assessments, LSM.lv, FBIH cycle reporting. Verified 07/09/2026.

11Key Dates

• 1918 — independence declared
• 1940 — Soviet occupation
• 4 May 1990 — declaration on restoring independence; full restoration 21 August 1991
• 1994 — withdrawal of Russian troops completed
• 2004 — NATO (29 March) and EU (1 May) accession
• 2014 — euro adopted
• 2017 — NATO forward presence established at Ādaži (Canada as framework nation); Slovak participation begins
• 2022 — legislative exclusion of Russian pipeline gas; transition of public schools to Latvian instruction; ban on 9 May gatherings
• 2023 — State Defence Service (conscription) reintroduced; Edgars Rinkēvičs becomes president in July; the Ādaži formation is upgraded toward brigade level
• February 2025 — desynchronisation from the BRELL grid
• 3 October 2025 — Slovak and Latvian foreign ministers hold bilateral talks
• 26 March 2026 — the Saeima legislates a minimum of 5% of GDP for defence from 2027
• 14 May 2026 — Prime Minister Siliņa resigns following drone incidents
• 28 May 2026 — Kulbergs caretaker cabinet takes office
• 1 July 2026 — Russia suspends the Pytalovo railway crossing
• 3 October 2026 — 15th Saeima election