Azerbaijan

1Kabinet ministrov (Vláda Azerbajdžanu)

2Parliament (Mili Majlis)

3Intelligence and Security Services (The Intel Community)

4Armed Forces (Azerbaijan Armed Forces)

Since 2020, Azerbaijan has transitioned to the so-called "Turkish model"—the army is transformed according to NATO standards (even though Azerbaijan is not a member).

• Minister of Defense: Gen. Zakir Hasanov.
• Main Branches: Land Forces, Air Force and Air Defense, Navy (Caspian Sea).
• Special Forces (XTQ): Elite units trained in Turkey and the USA. They are the pride of the army and are deployed in the most demanding operations.

Key Military Priorities 2026:

• Unmanned Systems: Massive use of drones (Bayraktar TB2/TB3, Akıncı, Israeli Haropy).
• Satellite Reconnaissance: Utilizing Azerbaijan's own Azersky satellites to monitor troop movements on the borders.
• Cyber Defense: A new command to combat hybrid threats (especially from Iran).
• Iranian Infiltration across the southern border.
• Cyber Attacks targeting the energy grid.
• Securing Tunnels and Bridges along the TRIPP corridor.

Strategic Military Partnerships:

• Turkey (Shusha Declaration): If Azerbaijan is attacked, Turkey must provide military assistance. This is de facto a military alliance.
• Israel: Main supplier of top-tier technologies (radars, drones, LORA missile systems). Azerbaijan pays with oil.
• USA (New for 2026): Cooperation in border guard training to protect the TRIPP corridor against weapons and drug smuggling.

5Alliances, Memberships and Treaty Framework

Azerbaijan is the one South Caucasus state that has joined none of the competing blocs. It sits outside the EU, NATO, the EAEU and the CSTO, and treats that position as leverage rather than as a gap.

• Turkey — Shusha Declaration (2021). The closest thing Baku has to a defence alliance: an attack on Azerbaijan obliges Turkish military assistance. It underpins the "Turkish model" transformation of the armed forces.
• Organization of Turkic States — full member; the principal multilateral platform Baku actively invests in.
• Non-Aligned Movement — member, and chaired the movement from 2019 into 2023. The formal expression of the balancing doctrine.
• European Union — no association agreement and no accession track. The relationship runs on the Strategic Energy Partnership Memorandum of July 2022 and on negotiations toward a new bilateral agreement.
• NATO — Partnership for Peace only. No membership, no application.
• CIS — member. Not in the EAEU and not in the CSTO.
• WTO — observer, not a member. This distinguishes Azerbaijan from both Armenia and Georgia.
• Other — Council of Europe (since 2001), OSCE, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, GUAM.

Sources: EU energy and neighbourhood pages, Organization of Turkic States, Carnegie Endowment (May 2026). Verified 07/09/2026.

6Energy

Energy is not one sector among others here. It is the instrument of Azerbaijani foreign policy and the reason Europe now negotiates with Baku on different terms than a decade ago.

• Southern Gas Corridor. The SCP–TANAP–TAP chain carries Caspian gas to Europe without touching Russian territory. It is expected to move roughly 12.8 bcm in 2026, broadly flat year-on-year.
• Reach. SOCAR supplied 14 countries in 2025 and 16 countries by 2026, up from 12 a year earlier. Germany and Austria were added in January 2026.
• Volume to Europe. Exports to the EU are up 56% since 2021; roughly 16.7 bcm went to Europe over the last year and the first four months of 2026. Under the 2022 EU agreement, supplies are to reach at least 20 bcm a year by 2027.
• Largest customer. Italy, at 9.5 bcm in 2025, about 16% of Italian gas imports.
• Capacity works. The first stage of TAP expansion adds roughly 1.2 bcm. SOCAR has signed a long-term arrangement with TotalEnergies, ADNOC's XRG platform and BOTAŞ to market gas from the offshore Absheron field, with exports via the Southern Gas Corridor from 2029.
• Oil. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline remains the main export artery and the strategic reason Georgia matters to Baku.

Sources: Euronews (July 2026), Astana Times (March 2026), Caucasus Business Journal, European Commission energy diversification pages. Verified 07/09/2026.

7Economy

• Headline growth is weak. The economy expanded by only 0.8% in the first half of 2026. The Central Bank cut its 2026 forecast from 2.9% to 1.1%; the Ministry of Finance works with 1.7%; Fitch has projected around 2%. The spread between these numbers is itself informative.
• The split. Over January to May 2026 the oil and gas sector contracted by 0.1% while the non-oil and gas sector grew 0.4%. Hydrocarbons are no longer the growth engine, and nothing has yet replaced them at scale.
• Diversification targets. The government projects the non-oil and gas share of GDP approaching 75.8% and 57% of budget revenues, against an oil share of GDP still measured at roughly 47% at the end of 2025. Treat the targets as policy intent rather than as achieved position.
• Sovereign buffer. SOFAZ, the state oil fund, remains the fiscal shock absorber and the vehicle for megaproject financing.
• Reconstruction. Karabakh and East Zangezur reconstruction is a standing budget item and a political priority, not a marginal programme.

Sources: Azerbaijani Ministry of Finance and Central Bank via APA and Azernews, Fitch via Report.az, Trading Economics. Verified 07/09/2026.

8National Interest Vector (Slovakia)

This is the strongest bilateral file of the three South Caucasus states, and it is driven by one hard deadline.

• The deadline. Slovakia must stop importing Russian gas from October 2027. That single fact structures the whole relationship.
• Gas. SPP ran a short-term pilot contract with SOCAR and first deliveries began in December 2024. Talks since then concern roughly 1.2 bcm a year after 2027, with Bratislava seeking a term of at least ten years.
• Political anchoring. A Slovak presidential visit to Azerbaijan, with Economy Minister Denisa Saková in the delegation, and a reciprocal Aliyev visit to Slovakia have given the file top-level cover on both sides.
• Beyond gas. Both governments have named manufacturing, transport, digitalisation and the defence industry as areas for expansion.
• Standing threads tracked by SCIH. The Silk Way West air-cargo link to Bratislava and Middle Corridor logistics diversification for Slovak exporters. Both are monitored; neither has produced a confirmed development in recent cycles.

Sources: CEE Energy News, APA, Trend.az, Caspian Post, Caliber.az. Verified 07/09/2026.

9Open Disputes and Sensitive Points

• Karabakh. Resolved militarily. The September 2023 operation ended the self-declared entity and the Armenian population left. Baku negotiates from a position of settled fact.
• The peace agreement. Initialled in Washington on 8 August 2025, alongside a signed joint declaration. Azerbaijan makes formal signature conditional on Armenia amending its constitution to remove language Baku reads as an implicit claim to Karabakh. Aliyev has publicly called this a red line.
• TRIPP / Zangezur. Baku consistently frames the route as a segment of the Middle Corridor, synchronising the Azerbaijani and American narratives into one axis and claiming strategic ownership of a project formally run in a US–Armenia format.
• Iran. The most volatile file. The Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran was attacked in early 2023. Relations were recovering, and Aliyev conveyed condolences at the Iranian embassy after the assassination of Iran's supreme leader on 28 February 2026. Since the escalation of the US–Iran war, Aliyev has ordered the armed forces to prepare countermeasures while stressing that Azerbaijan is not a participant. Tehran reads Baku's ties to Turkey, Israel and the United States as a security problem.
• Russia. The shooting down of Azerbaijan Airlines flight 8243 by Russian air defence in December 2024, with 38 dead, caused a sharp break. Baku suspended cooperation across several sectors and accelerated its turn toward the EU and the US. Partial acknowledgement came at the Aliyev–Putin meeting in Dushanbe in October 2025.
• Israel. A deep defence and technology relationship paid for substantially in oil. It is an asset in Baku and a provocation in Tehran.
• Domestic. There is no functioning parliamentary opposition. Independent media and civil society operate under severe constraint. This is the recurring point of friction with European institutions and it will not be resolved by the energy relationship.

Sources: Carnegie Endowment, CEPA, CACI Analyst, Caucasian Knot, Argumentum. Verified 07/09/2026.

10Key Dates

• 1991 — independence from the USSR
• September 1994 — the "Contract of the Century" opens the Caspian to Western majors
• 1994 — ceasefire ending the first Karabakh war
• 2006 — the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline enters service
• 2018 — TANAP commissioned
• 31 December 2020 — first Azerbaijani gas reaches Europe through TAP
• September to November 2020 — Second Karabakh war
• June 2021 — Shusha Declaration with Turkey
• July 2022 — Strategic Energy Partnership Memorandum with the EU
• September 2023 — military operation in Karabakh; the entity dissolves
• February 2024 — snap presidential election
• September 2024 — snap parliamentary election
• November 2024 — Baku hosts COP29
• December 2024 — AZAL flight 8243 shot down; first SOCAR gas deliveries to Slovakia begin
• October 2025 — Aliyev–Putin meeting in Dushanbe; partial Russian acknowledgement over AZAL
• 8 August 2025 — peace agreement initialled in Washington; TRIPP announced
• 28 February 2026 — assassination of Iran's supreme leader; regional escalation follows
• January 2026 — Azerbaijani gas exports to Germany and Austria begin